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Abstract—This paper presents a novel watermark generation
technique for the protection of embedded processors. In previous
work, a load circuit is used to generate detectable watermark pat-
terns in the ASIC power supply. This approach leads to hardware
area overheads. We propose removing the dedicated load circuit
entirely, instead to compensate the reduced power consumption
the watermark power pattern is emulated by reusing existing
clock gated sequential logic as a zero-overhead load circuit and
modulating the clock-gating enable signal with the watermark
sequence. The proposed technique has been validated through
experiments using two ASICs in 65nm CMOS, one with an
ARM Cortex-M0 microcontroller and one with a Cortex-A5
microprocessor. Silicon measurement results verify the viability
of the technique for embedded processors. Furthermore, the
proposed clock modulation technique demonstrates a signiﬁcant
area reduction, without compromising the detection performance.
In our experiments an area overhead reduction of 98% was
achieved. Through reuse of existing logic and reduction of
watermark hardware implementation costs, the proposed clock
modulation technique offers an improved robustness against
removal attacks.
Index Terms—Watermarking, Embedded Systems, CPA
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology scaling and innovations in modern processes
are allowing increasingly complex systems to be implemented
on a single die [1]. To support this design complexity it is
increasingly desirable to source sub-systems, such as Central
Processing Units (CPU), from external Intellectual Property
(IP) suppliers. IP blocks are usually delivered as either hard-
macros, full circuit layouts, or soft-macros, typically register-
transfer level (RTL) descriptions. The Virtual Socket Interface
(VSI) Alliance [2] proposes three approaches to the problem
of securing an IP: deterrent, protection and detection. The
deterrent approach may deter the infringement from occurring
through patents, copyrights, trade secrets, contracts or lawsuits
[2]. However, it does not provide physical protection. The
protection approach prevents unauthorized use of IP through
encryption. Nonetheless, encryption and rights managements
support in EDA tools is far from universal and pain-free
[3]. Therefore, IP blocks are often supplied as unprotected
design ﬁles that System-on-Chip (SoC) integrators can use
without any complication of their design ﬂow. As a result,
auditing the presence of IP in ﬁnished products is an important
challenge for IP providers. De-encapsulation and die-level
reverse engineering can be used to prove the presence of IP, but
the process is slow and costly [3], [4]. It is therefore desirable
to identify and prioritize IP candidates to be short-listed for
more thorough investigation.
The VSI Alliance proposes digital watermarking as one of
detection methods for physical IP protection, at various design
ﬂow levels [2]. The use of the soft IP is more desirable as it
offers the end user the highest level of ﬂexibility [2]. Methods
for the protection of soft IP can be divided into two groups,
where architecture of the watermark circuit is closely related
to the detection technique.
Watermark detection at output ports of a device through
application of input vectors has been reported as one of the
IP protection techniques in previous work [5]–[9]. Through an
addition of extra states into Finite State Machines (FSM) [5]–
[7], or modiﬁcation of existing states [8], [9], the area overhead
of watermark implementation is reduced, with a reported 0%
in [9]. Nevertheless, the IP vendor may not have sufﬁcient
knowledge about the ﬁnal design to able to use such detection
techniques and prove the IP infringement.
In [10], Becker et al applied Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) [11], as a watermark detection technique. The CPA
detects an embedded power watermark in the dynamic or static
current variations on the supply voltage rail. Therefore, no
additional dedicated connections to the input or output ports
of a device are required. However, a power watermark requires
two circuits: a watermark generation circuit (WGC) and a
load circuit (LC) [10], [12]. The architecture of the WGC
depends on the watermark sequence. Nonetheless, it is kept
relatively small, and 32 registers have been reported in [10],
[12]. The LC consists of shift registers and determines the
power consumed by the watermark circuit. Its size is closely
related to the system size. Zeiner et al report 92 out of 1332
lookup tables (LUT) on FPGA, a 6:9% of system area, were
used with each LUT conﬁgured as 16-bit shift register, for
simple arithmetic coder core [12]. Similarly, Becker et al
utilize 16 LUTs on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
cryptographic core [10]. It can be seen, that the majority of
area overhead in the current state-of-the-art power watermark
architecture is caused by the signiﬁcant size LC.
Embedded processors are increasingly constrained in terms
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Fig. 1. Architecture of (a) current state-of-the-art, (b) proposed clock modulation power watermark circuit.
Fig. 2. Timing diagram of current state-of-the-art (middle) and clock
modulation (bottom) watermark architectures.
of circuit area. Moreover, a watermark circuit embedded in the
soft IP design level is the most vulnerable to third party attacks
due to high visibility of the RTL description. It is therefore
crucial for the power watermark circuit to have negligible
impact on area overhead. The primary motivation of this work
is therefore the minimization of power watermark hardware
implementation costs, necessary for highly constrained embed-
ded processors. In this work, a novel technique is proposed to
generate particular power pattern through the modulation of
clock signal, without compromising watermark detectability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the cur-
rent state-of-the-art and proposed clock modulation architec-
ture of the watermark circuit are presented. The Correlation
Power Analysis watermark detection technique is discussed
in Section III. Silicon measurements are given in Section IV.
Section V, discusses hardware implementation overheads. The
improved robustness against removal attacks of the proposed
clock modulation watermark architecture is shown in Section
VI. Section VII, concludes the paper.
II. CLOCK MODULATION WATERMARK ARCHITECTURE
A power watermark is a redundant circuit added to an
existing IP block, with the aim of superimposing a weak but
deterministic signal on a supply voltage rail. The current state-
of-the-art power watermark [10], [12] implements a watermark
generation circuit (WGC) and a load circuit (LC), Fig. 1(a).
The WGC generates the watermark sequence, WMARK,
which controls the shift enable input of the LC, as shown
in Fig. 1(a). In Fig. 2, the timing diagram of the watermark
circuit is shown. The load register consists of an 8-bit shift
register initialized with 1010::: pattern, to maximize dynamic
power consumption when WMARK is 010. It can be seen,
that when WMARK is 010 the shift enable signal is 010 and
dynamic power is consumed, due to shift operation during
which all registers change their states. Analytical techniques
such as Correlation Power Analysis (Section III), have been
reported to detect deeply embedded watermark signals [10].
However, area overhead of the watermark circuit in Fig. 1(a)
is signiﬁcant, when compared to area overhead as low as 0%
with techniques [5]–[7] discussed in Section I.
To reduce area overhead, we propose a technique which
drives an IP sub-module with the watermark modulated clock
signal, as shown in Fig. 1(b). In digital circuits, the distri-
bution of a clock signal on a chip, also known as a clock
tree [13], contributes a signiﬁcant amount of dynamic power
consumption. In [14], the authors report that typically up to
50% of the total dynamic power is consumed by the system’s
clock signal. Since most of the processor design is sequential,
with a large number of registers being clocked, the fan-out
of the clock tree causes high dynamic power consumption.
The technique known as clock gating reduces the dynamic
power consumption, with a special clock gating logic cell
added to the clock tree, to switch off the parts of the designFig. 3. Simulation results of effect of the watermark power signal on the
total device power.
when it did not need to be updated [15]. To utilize such a
high and intrinsic to the system dynamic power consumption,
we propose to modulate the clock gates of an IP block. The
signiﬁcant size LC reported in previous publications [10], [12]
is thus removed. The architecture of the WGC is unmodiﬁed
and generates a watermark sequence, WMARK. The original
clock gate control signal, CLK CTRL, and WMARK
further control the enable signal of a clock gate of an IP block,
as shown in Fig. 1(b). Analogically, the original clock signal,
CLK, to the IP block is modiﬁed and replaced with the mod-
ulated clock signal, CLK WMARK. When WMARK is
010, the clock gate enable is 010 and CLK is propagated, hence
CLK WMARK = CLK. When WMARK is 000, CLK is
stopped at the clock gate and CLK WMARK = 0. In case
the watermark circuit is active during processor execution, the
entire IP block generates signiﬁcant dynamic power in clock
cycles when WMARK is 010. However, this may require an
additional synchronization between the watermark modulated
and other IP blocks, to ensure data is not corrupted, or increase
the throughput. Moreover, the size of the IP module must
be signiﬁcant to generate strong enough watermark power
signal, due to the background noise produced by the rest of
the system. In case the watermark circuit is active while the
entire system is inactive, the watermark power is consumed
entirely by clock tree buffers. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the
clock modulation technique produces higher switching activity
in comparison to watermark architecture implementing a load
circuit of Fig. 1(a). This means that clock buffers switch twice
in a single clock cycle during the rising and falling edges of
a clock signal. Therefore, the dynamic power consumed in a
single register by clock tree buffers is higher than the dynamic
power consumed by data switching in the same register, as
shown in Section V. In Section IV, experiments on silicon test
chips are performed, to validate if watermark power generated
in such way produces high enough amplitude to be detected
with Correlation Power Analysis.
III. WATERMARK DETECTION
Simulation results in Fig. 3 demonstrate the effect of an
additional watermark circuit on the device total power (in
relative terms). The watermark power signal (middle) is added
to the power consumed by the embedded system (top), and
generates the device total power (bottom). Since the watermark
power signal is a much lower amplitude, it is deeply embedded
in the overall device power signal. We therefore require an
analytical technique which determines the possibility and
the accuracy of watermark existence. Such a technique is
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [10], [11]. In this paper,
the CPA detection methodology proposed by Becker et al
[10] is followed. The CPA technique requires information
extracted from the measured power consumption of a device,
recorded using an oscilloscope. The relationship between the
expected (watermark sequence) and consumed power signals
is measured, as shown in (1).
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The watermark model vector, X, can be represented by a bi-
nary sequence. The sampling frequency of an oscilloscope, fs,
is much greater than the frequency of the system clock, fclk,
i.e. fs >> fclk. Hence, the measured signal is represented as
vector, Y , where each value is the average of power consumed
in a single clock cycle [10]. Vectors X and Y represent
data obtained over N clock cycles. The result is known as
correlation coefﬁcient,  [11]. It can vary from  1 to 1, with
1 representing two identical signals, and  1 representing two
identical but inverted signals. When  is 0, no relationship
occurs. Since both signals can be out of phase, the watermark
vector X is repeatedly rotated by a single clock cycle and  is
recalculated [10]. The number of rotations equals the period of
the watermark sequence. Once all correlation values have been
found, they are represented by a spread spectrum graph [10],
as shown in Section IV, Fig. 5. The watermark is only regarded
as detected if a single signiﬁcant correlation coefﬁcient can be
resolved, as shown in Section IV, Fig. 5(a).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To validate the proposed technique discussed in Section II,
we fabricated two ASIC designs in TSMC 65nm low leakage
CMOS technology, with nominal operating voltage of 1:2V.
The designs were completed using industry standard EDA
tools. In the ﬁrst design (chip I), the watermark circuit was
embedded as a hard macro block, on a separate power domain.
The SoC consists of the ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor IP
core, along with an on-chip bus and numerous commercial
IP blocks. In the second design (chip II), the watermark
circuit was embedded from RTL description. Therefore, the
watermark circuit was propagated through the entire design
ﬂow, which is closer to the intended usage scenario when
embedding watermarked soft IP. The chip consists of dual
core ARM Cortex-A5 microprocessor IP core and caches.
The SoC consists of the ARM Cortex-M0 and the water-
mark circuit. The watermark circuit architecture is the same
in both chips, Fig. 4(a). The WGC contains two sequence
generators which can be conﬁgured as either 32-bit Linear(a) (b)
Fig. 4. (a) Schematic diagram of the clock modulated watermark circuit embedded in test chips. (b) Test board.
Feedback Shift Registers or simple 32-bit circular shift reg-
isters. In our experiments, only a single sequence generator
was used, conﬁgured as 12-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR), which generated 12-bit maximum length sequence at
WMARK output signal. The redundant logic circuit contains
1;024 registers, divided into 32 words. The clock signal to
each 32-bit word is clock gated using the clock gate cell (ICG).
The clock enable signal of each clock gate cell is controlled
by WMARK. The clock signal is propagated through all 32
clock gates, when WMARK is 010. When WMARK is 000,
the clock signal is stopped at ICGs and no dynamic power
is consumed. All registers are pre-initialized to 000, hence no
data switching occurs. It can be seen in Fig. 4(a), that the
majority of watermark dynamic power is consumed by clock
buffers embedded in registers. Therefore, technique proposed
in Section II, can be validated with this experimental setup.
The test board is shown in Fig. 4(b). All power domains
were connected using the power jumpers and the total current
consumed by the chip was measured, using the shunt 270m

resistor. The operating frequency of both chips was 10MHz.
The current signal was measured using an Agilent MSO6032A
oscilloscope with Agilent 1130A active differential probe, at
a sampling frequency of 500MHz. Therefore, 50 samples per
single clock cycle were averaged, to ﬁnd the measured power
vector, Y . The obtained N clock cycles, for the computation
of a single , was 300;000. We attempted to detect the
watermark while running the Dhrystone benchmark, which
reﬂects the activities of the integer IP processor core, such
as integer arithmetic, string operations, logic decisions and
memory accesses in a general computing application [16]. The
Dhrystone benchmark was executed on ARM Cortex-M0 on
the SoC, on both chips. Although, on chip II Cortex-A5 did
not execute any program both cores, along with the on-chip
bus were active, which accounted for a signiﬁcant portion of
background noise in the system.
The spectra of correlation results are shown in Fig. 5. Since
the period of 12-bit maximum length sequence (212   1) is
shorter than 300;000 clock cycles, the watermark sequence
was repeated multiple times within a vector, X. It can be seen,
that the correlation peak for chip I occurs at approximately the
3;800th rotation of the watermark sequence, Fig. 5(a), and at
approximately the 2;400th rotation of the watermark sequence
for chip II, Fig. 5(c). Since no other correlation peaks exist,
the watermark can be regarded as detected. To conﬁrm that
correlation peaks were not the result of the correlated system
noise, the watermark circuit was disabled and experiments
were repeated on both chips. As can be seen in Fig. 5(b)
and Fig. 5(d), no correlation peaks occurred when watermark
power pattern was not present. To investigate the repeatability
of detection results, the experiments were performed 100 times
on both chips. In Fig. 6 correlation coefﬁcients are shown in
a form of a box plot. It can be seen, that medians when X
and Y were not in phase is close to 0. However, when both
vectors were in phase medians are much higher and distinctive
correlation peak can be distinguished. The variance of all
results represented by the box in the ﬁgure accounts for 95% of
all correlation coefﬁcients, with extreme values shown as dots.
As can be seen, the correlation coefﬁcient peak is present in all
experiments on both chips. Therefore, an embedded watermark
was successfully detected in all repetitions. The redundant
logic in our experiments is a stand-alone circuit, however, in
the end application a commercial IP sub-module can be reused
with the same results, reducing the area overhead.
V. AREA AND POWER OVERHEADS
The area of the current state-of-the-art watermark circuit
is greatly occupied by the signiﬁcant size load circuit (LC),
as shown in Section II, Fig. 1(a). In case of system scaling,
the size of the watermark generation circuit (WGC) does not
change, while the size of the LC varies and increases with the
system size. This effect is caused by the Correlation Power
Analysis detection technique, which requires substantial wa-
termark power signal to detect an embedded watermark circuit.
Various novel detection techniques have been demonstrated
in recent publications [17], [18], which detect an embedded
circuit of negligible size. However, similarly to many soft IP
protection techniques [5]–[9], an access to watermarked design
throughout an entire design ﬂow, or access to post-fabricated
design internals are necessary for successful detection. This is
not possible for many IP vendors. The proposed watermark0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
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Fig. 5. Spread spectra of correlation results from test chips. Chip I with (a) active, (b) inactive, watermark circuit. Chip II with (c) active, (d) inactive
watermark circuit.
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Fig. 6. Box plots of correlation coefﬁcient results from (a) Chip I and (b) Chip II, when experiment was repeated 100 times.
TABLE I
POWER CONSUMPTION OF PLACED AND ROUTED LOAD CIRCUIT
Load Circuit Power Consumption Total Watermark
Implementation Dynamic Static Total Dynamic Power
Clock Buffers Modulation 1.51 mW 0.404uW 1.51mW 95.6% No Data Switching
Clock Buffers Modulation 1.80 mW 0.407uW 1.80mW 96.8% 256 Switching Registers
Clock Buffers Modulation 2.09 mW 0.407uW 2.09mW 97.2% 512 Switching Registers
Clock Buffers Modulation 2.66 mW 0.408uW 2.66mW 98% 1024 Switching Registers
TABLE II
LOAD CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
Detectable Load Number of Area
Circuit Dynamic Load Circuit Registers Overhead
Power Consumption N = PLoad=(1:126uW + 1:476uW) Increase
PLoad
0.25 mW 96 89%
0.5 mW 192 94%
1 mW 384 97%
1.5 mW 576 98%
5 mW 1921 99%
10 mW 3843 100%
clock modulation technique enables watermark implemen-
tation at RTL, with negligible area overhead, and allows
post-fabrication watermark detection with the CPA detection
technique. Furthermore, the size of the watermark circuit is
the same for all systems, hence does not need scaling, since
the watermark architecture only requires implementation of
the negligible size WGC.
To determine the area overhead reduction of the proposed
clock modulation technique to the current state-of-the-art
watermark implementation demonstrated in Section II, Fig.
1(a), the power consumption of the fully placed and routed
watermark circuit was estimated with Synopsys Primetime-
PX, using 65nm1 technology library. The power consumption
1TSMC 65nm low leakage technology library.of the clock modulated redundant load circuit is shown in
Table I. In the top of the table, the LC is implemented as shown
in Section IV, Fig. 4(a). Hence, the dynamic power consump-
tion is caused entirely by clock buffers. This implementation
was found to account for 95:6% of total watermark circuit
dynamic power. The number of switching registers is further
increased, until all 1;024 registers switch when WMARK is
010. Therefore, the dynamic power consumption increases and
is caused by both data switching and clock buffers modulation.
For the comparison, the power consumption of the WGC is
the same for all sizes of LC and equals 60W. It can be
seen, that the dynamic power consumed by clock buffers is
higher than the dynamic power caused by data switching. On
average, the dynamic power consumption of a single clock
buffer is 1:476uW, and data switching in a single register
is 1:126uW. In Table II, the number of switching registers,
N, required to implement the LC of Section II, Fig. 1(a), is
shown for various system sizes. It is based on the required
LC dynamic power consumption (in relative terms), to be
easily detected with Correlation Power Analysis. The WGC
requires only 12 registers. Therefore, it consumes the same
and negligible power, for any system size, and is not included
in the table. As can be seen, approximately 580 registers are
required to implement the LC with the current state-of-the-art
watermark architecture, to consume the same dynamic power
as the clock gated redundant circuit in Section IV, Fig. 4(a).
With the proposed clock modulation technique, the dynamic
power consumed by clock buffers can be obtained through
the modulation of clock tree buffers of existing logic, Section
II, Fig. 1(b). Hence, an area overhead reduction of 98% can
be achieved, when compared to the technique in [10]. The
area overhead reduction depends on the system size, as shown
in Table II. As can be seen, the area overhead reduction is
less in smaller systems, but still signiﬁcant when compared to
the current state-of-the-art LC watermark implementation. In
bigger systems, the area overhead reduction is close to 100%.
Moreover, watermark implementation can be system speciﬁc.
Various top level IP modules or lower level sub-modules
can be modulated with the proposed technique. The power
overhead of the watermark implementation can be therefore
tailored to the system.
VI. IMPROVED ROBUSTNESS
One of the major cornerstones of all IP watermarking tech-
niques is the robustness against third party removal attacks.
It is performed with the aim of removing watermark circuit
from the design. In the case of soft IP, a removal attack
can be performed at the RTL description level, due to high
visibility of the system [2]. Since the current state-of-the-art
watermark circuit implements a signiﬁcant LC, the removal is
easily performed. Moreover, as the watermark is a stand-alone
circuit, removal has no impact on system performance.
The clock modulation technique proposed in this paper
signiﬁcantly reduces area overhead of the watermark circuit,
leading to an enhanced robustness to removal attacks. Since,
the watermark generation circuit (WGC) can be embedded in
various sub-modules, detection capabilities of an attacker are
signiﬁcantly reduced. As can be seen in Section II, Fig. 1(b),
the proposed watermark implementation does not produce a
stand-alone circuit, and therefore the system’s functionality is
greatly impaired when watermark is removed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A novel clock modulation watermark technique for embed-
ded processors has been proposed. The technique was vali-
dated with two ASIC designs. The signiﬁcant area reduction
has been demonstrated, when compared to the current state-
of-the-art watermark circuit architecture, reported in previous
publications, with 98% area reduction obtained from experi-
mental results. Through embedding the watermark circuit in
existing logic, signiﬁcantly improved robustness to removal
attacks was achieved.
The proposed technique offers a considerable area overhead
and robustness improvement, when compared to the current
state-of-the-art watermark implementation. However, when it
is implemented in an embedded processor, the performance
is impaired, due to the 010 and 000 pattern of a watermark
sequence. Moreover, synchronization issues may occur. Ad-
dressing these issues form part of our continuing research.
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